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Abstract 18 
 19 
Although multitasking has been the subject of a large number of papers and 20 
experiments, the term task is still not well defined. In this opinion paper, we adopt the 21 
ideomotor perspective to define the term task and distinguish it from the terms goal and 22 
“action”. In our opinion, actions are movements executed by an actor to achieve a concrete 23 
goal. Concrete goals are represented as anticipated sensory consequences that are associated 24 
with an action in an ideomotor manner. Concrete goals are nested in a hierarchy of more and 25 
more abstract goals, which form the context of the corresponding action. Finally tasks are 26 
depersonalized goals, i.e., goals that should be achieved by someone. However tasks can be 27 
assigned to a specific person or group of persons, either by a third party or by the person or 28 
the group of persons themselves. By accepting this assignment the depersonalized task 29 
becomes a personal goal. In our opinion, research on multitasking needs to confine its scope 30 
to the analysis of concrete tasks, which result in concrete goals as anticipated sensory 31 
consequences of the corresponding action. We further argue that the distinction between dual- 32 
and single-tasking is dependent on the subjective conception of the task assignment, the goal 33 
representation and previous experience. Finally, we conclude that it is not the tasks, but the 34 
performing of the tasks, i.e. the actions that cause costs in multi-tasking experiments.  35 
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What is a task? – An ideomotor perspective 36 
‘Task’ is an important concept in psychology and action science. However, despite a 37 
growing body of literature addressing opportunities and limits of human dual- or multi-38 
tasking, the term task is still poorly defined. More than 20 years ago, Rogers and Monsell 39 
(1995, p. 208) acknowledged “that it is difficult to define with precision, even in the restricted 40 
context of discrete reaction tasks, what constitutes a ‘task’”. More recently, Schneider and 41 
Logan (2014) stated that this plea for a definition has largely been ignored since then. In the 42 
following, we argue that a definition of the term task is required to constrain the scope of 43 
multitasking research, to clarify how many tasks a person performs, and to broaden our 44 
understanding of interference between tasks. 45 
In everyday language, tasks are usually understood as  demands that are  generally 46 
achievable by an action or a set of actions, e.g. bake a cake, be a good student, or switch on 47 
the light. However, the required actions may not be specified by the assignment of the task. 48 
Tasks may differ in their levels of abstractness and may consist of several less abstract 49 
subtasks, which can be completed sequentially or simultaneously (e.g. learning for the exam, 50 
attaining lessons, participating in an experiment, press a button).  51 
Conversely, in cognitive science papers, “the term task can be basically understood as 52 
‘what subjects have to do in an experiment’.” (Philipp & Koch, 2010, p. 383) or, in more 53 
formal terms, is defined as a “representation of the instructions required to achieve accurate 54 
performance of an activity” (Schneider & Logan, 2014, p. 29).  Kiesel et al. state that “tasks 55 
entail performing some specified mental operation or action in response to stimulus input” 56 
(2010, p. 850). Yet, these statements are descriptions rather than definitions of a task, and do 57 
not help to differentiate distinct tasks.  58 
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The vague definition of the term task leads to serious ambiguities in the understanding 59 
of multitasking behavior and its cognitive underpinnings. To give an example, it remains 60 
unclear if bimanual coordination tasks like playing piano should be regarded as a single task 61 
(Monno, Temprado, Zanone, & Laurent, 2002; Wolff & Cohen, 1980), or if playing with the 62 
right hand and the left hand must be seen as two independent tasks and thus as a case of dual-63 
task behavior (Franz, Swinnen, Zelaznik, & Walter, 2001; Swinnen & Wenderoth, 2004). 64 
According to the former assumption, professional pianists would simply accomplish a single 65 
task and there would be no reason to predict interference between actions of the left and the 66 
right hand at all. However, if the latter assumption holds, pianists would perform a dual-task 67 
but bypass interference or crosstalk. As a consequence, such dual-task skills would question 68 
theories postulating a bottleneck and arguing that tasks can only be processed sequentially 69 
(Pashler, 1994). Freedberg, Wagschal, and Hazeltine (2014) argue that the distinction between 70 
single and dual task is not determined by objective criteria but rather “depends on how the 71 
participants conceive of their task” (2014, p. 1698). This view is supported by experiments of 72 
Dreisbach and coworkers (Dreisbach, Goschke, & Haider, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 73 
2009), who observed that the way participants are instructed changes their perception about 74 
the task being a single or dual task. Recently, McIsaac, Lamberg, and Muratori (2015) 75 
suggested a taxonomy of dual tasks. They propose that “dual tasking is the concurrent 76 
performance of two tasks that can be performed independently, measured separately and have 77 
distinct goals” (McIsaac et al., 2015, p. 2). However, in their concept it remains unclear which 78 
performance exactly is considered as a task and what “distinctiveness” means with respect to 79 
goals.   80 
The goal of this paper is to bring more clarity to the blurred concept of a task. In 81 
agreement with McIsaac et al. (2015), we propose that a task relates to an action to be 82 
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executed and a goal to be achieved. In our opinion, it is helpful to adopt an ideomotor 83 
perspective that takes the mutual relationship between actions and goals into account. The 84 
ideomotor perspective surely narrows the scope of our task definition, however it serves to 85 
explicate tacit assumptions. Moreover it will help scientists from other theoretical fields to 86 
sharpen their understanding of the term task by accepting or rejecting parts of our 87 
assumptions.   88 
The ideomotor perspective 89 
Every action, from complex action sequences studied in sports and exercise sciences 90 
to simple button pressing used in cognitive psychology, elicits perceptual consequences. 91 
According to the ideomotor principle (Herbart, 1825; James, 1890; see Hommel, Müsseler, 92 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001 for a more recent formulation) behavior is selected, initiated, and 93 
controlled by an anticipation of the sensory consequences that will follow from the respective 94 
action. The bidirectional associations between actions and their sensory consequences are 95 
acquired in two phases. In the first phase, associative links between cognitive representations 96 
of actions and effects are established. The associations are learned by producing movements, 97 
either randomly or reflexively, and observing the sensory consequences. Importantly, Elsner 98 
and Hommel (2004) revealed that this learning relies on predictability (i.e., contingency) and 99 
temporal proximity (i.e. contiguity).    100 
In the second step, these associations are used to intentionally re-produce previously 101 
learned effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992). Thus, the 102 
representation of the intended effects directly trigger the corresponding action pattern (for 103 
reviews, see Hommel, 2013; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010) and this close link of mental 104 
representations of goals, associated motor patterns and actually perceived effects provides the 105 
basis of action control.  106 
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Unfortunately, the term goal is ill defined as well. The definition of ‘goal’ has to take 107 
different levels of abstractness into account (Hommel, Brown, & Nattkemper, 2016; Monsell, 108 
2003). Abstract goals (like “be a good student”) can be achieved in multiple ways by a series 109 
of different actions, and the actual achievement of abstract goals may eventuate a 110 
considerable amount of time after the actions. Concrete goals (like “pressing a button as 111 
quickly as possible”) are achieved by ideomotor actions, whereas abstract goals will not be 112 
associated with sensory consequences and therefore will not lead to actions. Rather, “at best, 113 
they can be helpful when looking for a concrete, sensory action goal” (Hommel et al., 2016, 114 
p. 65). For example, the abstract task of being a good student will provide the basis for the 115 
compliance with a task, like pressing a button as quickly as possible (see Figure 1).  116 
insert Figure 1 about here 117 
Our narrow definition of concrete goals overcomes the problem that different nested 118 
abstract goals like being a good student, smarming over the professor, and earning course 119 
credit can be achieved by just a single action – pressing a button. Although in this example 120 
three nested abstract goals are achieved (and therefore three nested abstract tasks are 121 
performed) through the same single action, this behavior would not be considered as 122 
multitasking.  123 
Having defined actions and goals, we now turn to the definition of a task. Goals and 124 
tasks share central features, in that they represent future states that usually differ from the 125 
current state. Both, goals and tasks, can relate to relative abstract or concrete states. We 126 
suggest, that the difference between the two is that a goal is personal, meaning that it is bound 127 
to a specific person striving for this goal. On the contrary, a task is not bound to a specific 128 
person, because it describes “what has to be done” by any participant. However, the link 129 
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between a task and a goal is that a task can be assigned by a third party (a single person, a 130 
group of persons or an institution to a person or a group of persons (Of course, it is possible to 131 
assign a task to oneself, too). It is then the duty of every single person to decide whether he or 132 
she accepts the task assignment. If he or she does, the depersonalized task becomes a personal 133 
goal of that specific person.  134 
The abstractness of a goal and the associated sensory consequences may depend on the 135 
level of expertise and the amount of practice of action, however. This has direct implications 136 
for the conceptualization of a task. We tackle two questions, which need to be addressed when 137 
analyzing dual-tasking or multitasking behavior. a) What separates a task-driven motor 138 
behavior from behavior that would not be regarded as task-driven? b) When can behavior be 139 
considered as driven by a single task, and when do we speak of dual- or multi-tasking? In the 140 
following sections, we no longer focus on the difference between goal and task, but 141 
presuppose that a person, who was assigned a specific task, accepts this assignment as his or 142 
her personal goal.  143 
A task or not a task? 144 
As mentioned above, the abstractness and the representation of a goal may be 145 
dependent on the experience an individual has with the corresponding action. Learning 146 
research hass shown that practice does not only improve performance on that activity, but that 147 
it can also lead to a qualitatively different mode of processing. This change in processing 148 
mode is commonly referred to as automatization.  149 
Automatization is mostly regarded as a process that evolves continuously over time, 150 
without any discontinuities from a least automatic processing mode to a most automatic 151 
processing mode. Models and theories of automatization have been developed for different 152 
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domains of activities.  For motor activities, Fitts and Posner (1967) developed a three stage 153 
model of motor learning. In the cognitive phase, the learner has to identify the goals of the 154 
actions and develop strategies to reach these goals. In the associative phase, cognitive 155 
processes are not only focused on the control of the actuators, but movements are associated 156 
with situational constraints. In the automatic phase, the actor can achieve the action’s goals 157 
without conscious attentional processes being involved. Although Fitts and Posner define 158 
different stages, they conceptualize continuous transitions from stage to stage, rather than a 159 
clear-cut entry into a certain stage. For bimanual coordination tasks, Puttemans, Wenderoth, 160 
and Swinnen (2005) showed significant changes in brain activation in the course of learning 161 
from the cognitive stage to an advanced level of automatization. 162 
Similarly, Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) demonstrated a transition from conscious to 163 
automatic processing in the course of learning for perceptual tasks. For instance, they argued 164 
that children learning to read are required to process features, letters, words and their meaning 165 
but that parts of this learning process can be automatized, and so they concluded that 166 
conscious, or controlled, processing is limited but can be used for complex learning.  167 
In the present article we aim at discussing whether, from an ideomotor perspective, the 168 
transition from a non-automatic to an automatic activity equals the transition from a task to a 169 
non-task. Ideomotor theory conceptualizes motor cognition as a combination of automatic and 170 
non-automatic subcomponents (Thomaschke, Hopkins, & Miall, 2012a, 2012b). Non-171 
automatic motor components are typically associated with action planning. That is, for 172 
example, deciding which hand to use, which object to grasp, which object to avoid. Action 173 
planning operates on largely categorical representations, is relatively slow, and is mostly 174 
accompanied by conscious awareness (Glover, 2004; Thomaschke, 2012). These non-175 
automatic components are concerned with the selection of action options in an ideomotor 176 
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fashion (i.e. based on their goals). For automatic action components, there are two different 177 
concepts of how automatization can be explained, the directions-of-processing approach and 178 
the levels-of-control approach (Neumann, 1984). According to the directions-of-processing 179 
approach, automatic processing meets three main criteria: it operates without capacity, it is 180 
not demanding attention, and – most important in the context of this article – it is driven by 181 
bottom up processes and not by intention (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; but see Neumann, 182 
1984). The levels-of-control approach claims that action parameters are specified by three 183 
sources, skills, input information, and attentional processes. In the case of underspecification, 184 
skills and input information are lacking or not specific enough, so attentional processes are 185 
necessary to specify the action parameters. In the case of overspecification, input provides the 186 
information in several variants, e.g. multiple apples in a tree, each of which specifies the 187 
action of grasping (Neumann, 1989). Attentional processes are needed to specify the choice of 188 
the concrete goal.  How these choice problems relate to multitasking is discussed in Bröker et 189 
al. (under review) in this issue. If skills and input information specify action parameters there 190 
is no need for attentional processes (Neumann, 1984, 1989). Action is then controlled by an 191 
automatic “subroutine”, where the anticipated effects do not necessarily rise to awareness. 192 
Blakemore, Wolpert, and Frith (2002) presented an overview of empirical evidence in favor 193 
of the latter approach. They found that awareness of movement only happens when the 194 
discrepancy between intended and actual sensory consequences becomes large.  195 
With respect to a task definition, the question of whether automatic activities are goal 196 
directed, i.e. controlled by anticipated sensory consequences, becomes important. The two 197 
concepts of automatization would offer different answers to this question. Within the 198 
direction-of-processing approach, automatic activities are not under intentional control. As a 199 
consequence they are not directed towards an intended goal, not controlled by sensory 200 
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consequences and cannot be considered as driven by a task. Following the levels-of-control 201 
approach, automatic activities are goal-directed and thus must be seen as driven by a task. 202 
Blakemore et al. (2002) developed their approach to automatization from the theory of 203 
internal models, which is highly compatible with the ideomotor approach. Both approaches 204 
stress the importance of a goal as anticipated sensory consequences for controlling action, 205 
although ideomotor theory does not contain a forward signal. As such ideomotor theory is 206 
more focused on perception as controlling factor in action, whereas internal models 207 
emphasize motor control (Gentsch, Weber, Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2016).  208 
Consequently, with the ideomotor perspective, we regard highly learned automatic activities 209 
as goal directed actions and thus as driven by a task. 210 
One task or multiple tasks?  211 
The human cognitive system is adept at integrating related information. The 212 
consideration of task integration is important when analyzing multitasking behavior because 213 
task integration could turn a seeming dual task into a single task. In implicit learning, in 214 
particular task integration, refers to the concept of an old evolutionary system that binds 215 
information that covaries in the world, which has often been demonstrated in serial-reaction 216 
time studies with a covarying secondary task (Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003; 217 
Schmidtke & Heuer, 1997). The integration of related information, or features, broadly 218 
equaling the understanding of task-integration, can be explained through approaching its 219 
influencing top-down and bottom-up factors. While the top-down factors impose features on 220 
the task based on individual processing habits or preferences, bottom-up factors explain how 221 
participants extract relevant co-occurring features from a task.   222 
If action is controlled by its sensory consequences then it is likely that the integration 223 
of related information also occurs on the level of these sensory consequences or effects. 224 
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Introducing distal effects into the experimental setting allows for dissociating the action (e.g. 225 
“press button”) from the action’s goal (e.g. “switch on the light”). As Hommel (1993) nicely 226 
demonstrated, the introduction of a goal has serious consequences for action control and – in 227 
his experiment –inverts the Simon effect. In a striking experiment, Mechsner, Kerzel, 228 
Knoblich, and Prinz (2001) had participants rotate two levers under a table. The lever’s 229 
rotation was transmitted to a rotation of flags visible above the table. For one lever, this 230 
transmission was done in a crooked ratio, e.g. 4:3. The participant’s goal was to produce an 231 
antiphase rotation of the two flags, which required a 4:3 ratio of lever rotations. This is strong 232 
evidence for information integration on the level of goals. Others also showed that even 233 
actions between two co-actors are coded in terms of one’s own effects (e.g. Pfister, Dignath, 234 
Hommel, & Kunde, 2013) or joint effects (e.g. Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010). 235 
Hence, two tasks, which can be coded in terms of their (joint) sensory consequences, can 236 
potentially be integrated into a single task (for an overview, see Mechsner, 2004). 237 
A further factor to be considered is combination specific learning. On the one hand, 238 
Hazeltine, Teague, and Ivry (2002) demonstrated no impact of combination-specific learning 239 
when they presented to their participants stimuli for a visual-manual and an auditory-vocal 240 
task. Unlike most dual-task experiments, they did not use the same set of stimuli for training 241 
and test sessions, but introduced some stimulus combinations in the test session only. Beyond 242 
the expectation that dual-task costs would be reduced because of the learning of stimulus 243 
pairs, they found equally elaborate performance for unpracticed stimulus combinations 244 
compared to practiced combinations and concluded that combination specific learning and 245 
integration had not occurred. On the other hand a chord task experiment by Hazeltine, 246 
Aparicio, Weinstein, and Ivry (2007) showed that a large portion of performance 247 
improvement could be explained by the learning of specific piano chords. In their task, 248 
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participants pressed either 3 out of 5 piano-like keys with one hand for an individual chord, or 249 
6 out of 10 piano-like keys (2 x 5) with both hands for a combined response. Results show 250 
that although both novel and practiced individually performed chords were similar in quality, 251 
slower performance for unpracticed chords occurred for combined responses, suggesting 252 
combination-specific learning for simultaneous task execution. The authors suggested that 253 
these contrasting results emerged from different use of modalities. Whereas the chord task 254 
required the same modalities, distinct modalities in the earlier study might have reduced the 255 
likelihood of forming associations between the two tasks. Also Hazeltine and collaborators 256 
(2007) hypothesized that the chord task, which in contrast to the earlier study forced 257 
participants to produce simultaneous responses, fostered an integrated representation and 258 
increased the likelihood of conceptualizing the experiment as one task. The significance of the 259 
diverging results is important for the aspect of “separating information” as highlighted above. 260 
If simultaneous, same-modality tasks lead to the integration of two tasks, then participants 261 
may either be unable to perform each task as a single-task after learning them as a dual-task or 262 
perform the secondary task comparatively deficient together with a different primary task 263 
(Wohldmann, Healy, & Bourne, 2010). 264 
Another top-down factor is the type of practice. Several experiments found dual-task 265 
performance to be better compared to single-task performance when the dual-task had been 266 
trained as such. Performance on a time production task for example was better when 267 
simultaneously performed with an alphabet-counting task because participants felt the 268 
secondary task aided the primary task e.g. in an arbitrary rhythm (Healy, Wohldmann, Parker, 269 
& Bourne, 2005). Researchers concluded that participants learned procedures that eased 270 
simultaneous performance and that primary and secondary task were treated as, and merged 271 
into, a fully integrated set of requirements of a single functional task (Waszak, Hommel, & 272 
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Allport, 2003). As elaborated earlier, performance changes could be also attributed to 273 
automatization of one or both tasks. However Ruthruff, van Selst, Johnston, and Remington 274 
(2006) argued that automatization is distinct from task-integration. According to a task-275 
integration hypothesis, dual-task practice would be more effective than single task practice 276 
and reduce or eliminate dual-task costs. An automatization hypothesis would predict 277 
successful dual-tasking independent of whether single or dual-task conditions have been 278 
practiced.  279 
Additionally, instructions may lead to task integration. In a task switching experiment 280 
(Dreisbach et al., 2007), participants had to react to eight different stimuli (words) with the 281 
respective key press. Participants received different instructions, yet defining the same 282 
actions. One group had to perform eight tasks with each task corresponding to an S-R 283 
mapping. Another group received instructions that integrated four S-R mappings to one 284 
distinct task with respect to the word color, resulting in two different integrated tasks. 285 
Although in this experiment task integration was highly disadvantageous and led to 286 
significantly higher reaction times, participants were unable to separate the integrated tasks. 287 
In another experiment Dreisbach and Haider (2008) also analyzed switch costs and were able 288 
to prove that it was also possible to integrate all eight SR-mapping into one single task with 289 
the appropriate instructions. 290 
In addition to top-down factors, there is some evidence about the influence of bottom-291 
up factors on task-integration. One basic idea is that mechanisms of covariation or statistical 292 
learning allow the extraction of structure (Chun & Jiang, 1999; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & 293 
Scholl, 2005) and that task integration will occur when covariations in one or more 294 
dimensions, such as time or space in the stimulus environment, exist (Schmidtke & Heuer, 295 
1997; Reber, 1989; Heuer & Schmidtke, 1996).  296 
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To illustrate the idea of covariation learning of specific stimulus-response 297 
contingencies, consider a typical serial reaction time (SRT) task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). 298 
Participants typically exhibit faster reaction times (RTs) in blocks of trials that follow a 299 
specific sequence and prolonged RTs in blocks with random sequence. This difference is 300 
taken as an indicator of covariation learning. Taking this further, Schmidtke and Heuer (1997) 301 
combined this SRT with an auditory go/no go task that required a pedal press upon hearing 302 
high-pitched tones. Tones were either random, in 5-element or in a 6-element sequence. When 303 
tone sequences of six elements were combined with visual sequences of six elements 304 
participants were able to reduce reaction times and the mean number of attempts to learn the 305 
sequence. Schmidtke and Heuer (1997) argued that the additional tone-counting task could be 306 
integrated into the sequence of alternating repeated visual cues. In another paper, Heuer and 307 
Schmidtke (1996) already claimed that primary-task stimuli and secondary-task stimuli are 308 
not processed separately but as an "integrated sequence of alternating visual and auditory 309 
stimuli" (p. 132). It has further been argued that the integration of two simultaneously 310 
presented tasks is likely to occur when there is consistency in the task requirements 311 
(Wohldmann et al., 2010), when it is perceived as resource-saving or at least as reducing the 312 
number of action goals  (Donk & Sanders, 1989; Lehle & Hübner, 2009) or when there is a 313 
large similarity between stimulus and response modalities and they are not perceived as 314 
distinct (Hazeltine et al., 2007). Theories of associative learning thus concluded that either the 315 
degree of similarity between individual stimuli properties or combined properties of stimuli 316 
define the strength of associations, and thus participants’ representations of the tasks and the 317 
propensity to integrate them (Freedberg et al., 2014; Philipp & Koch, 2010).  318 
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Conclusion  319 
We define a task as an abstract, depersonalized description of a future state. A task can 320 
be assigned to a person, and if that person accepts this assignment, it becomes their personal 321 
goal. According to the ideomotor perspective, concrete goals are coded as anticipated sensory 322 
consequences of the corresponding action, while abstract goals form the context that constrain 323 
the number of possible concrete goals. We confine our considerations regarding the definition 324 
a task to concrete goals. This restriction helps to clarify the scope of scientific investigations 325 
concerned with dual- or multitasking. Results obtained from concrete dual-task experiments, 326 
like button pressing and tone counting, may not transfer to abstract dual-tasks like being a 327 
good student and preparing for a lecture. With these specifications, we argue that actions that 328 
were automatized through extensive learning must be regarded as tasks, because they are 329 
initiated and controlled by intentional processes, albeit not necessarily associated with 330 
conscious awareness. Therefore, activities like walking or the control of posture must be 331 
treated as tasks. This is in line with the current opinion, where researchers use walking or 332 
postural control as one task in dual-task experiments (McIsaac & Benjapalakorn, 2015; 333 
Woollacott & Shumway-Cook, 2002; Yogev-Seligmann, Hausdorff, & Giladi, 2008).   334 
The conception of a task as one single integrated task or as two independent single 335 
tasks is highly dependent on top down processes and can be influenced by instructions or 336 
experience. There is experimental support that this integration occurs on the level of the 337 
sensory consequences of the respective actions (e.g. Mechsner et al., 2001). In addition, 338 
bottom-up processes serve to detect covariations in perception or action. Exploitation of these 339 
covariations also leads to task-integration (e.g. Schmidtke & Heuer, 1997). Consequently, it is 340 
not possible to define a distinction between dual- and single tasks independent of experience 341 
of the participants, presentation of the instructions or features of the situation. This subjective 342 
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characteristic demands the analysis of participants’ behavior on an individual level. Caution is 343 
needed to avoid circular explanations of dual-task behavior: Dual-task costs should not serve 344 
to prove the processing of two single tasks and at the same time be used as dependent variable 345 
to measure dual-task costs. 346 
Finally, we considered the difference between action and task. In our opinion, the 347 
main difference is the depersonalization of a task. A task can be undertaken by another person 348 
or can be delegated to another person. Moreover, a task can be assigned to a team or an 349 
institution. Additionally, a task is not necessarily associated with observable behavior. In 350 
contrast, an action is intrinsically tied to a specific actor, the person that is performing the task 351 
by achieving his or her goal, and always includes a motor behavior that can be observed. 352 
Therefore, there is no problem assigning multiple tasks to a participant - in an experiment or 353 
in real life. The problematic part is to achieve multiple goals and to execute multiple actions. 354 
Consequently, it is more appropriate to speak of “multi-action” instead of “multi-tasking”. 355 
356 
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 530 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of tasks, goals, and actions. Tasks are marked with a grey 531 
background, goals with a white background and the action with a black background. In this 532 
example, the dean formulates the task to acquire grants. He or she assigns this task to the 533 
researcher. By accepting this assignment the task becomes the researcher’s personal goal. 534 
Abstract goals and tasks are in clouds, concrete goals and tasks in rectangles. The empty 535 
clouds and rectangles indicate that abstract goals could have several (concrete or abstract) 536 
subgoals. Bold arrows indicate the assignment of a task to a specific person. The abstract 537 
goals form the context of the concrete goal, in this case to comply with the researcher’s task 538 
assignment. 539 
